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PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE REFORM:  
A SUGGESTIVE ACTION PLAN 
 
 
 
Governments have long used State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as instruments to achieve their 
social and economic developmental goals. Until about the 1970s, in most countries it 
appeared as though they were having some success. In the 1980s, however, there were 
increasing signs of weaknesses in the SOE sector. Protection from competition, bankruptcy 
and takeover allowed them to become inefficient. With the world recession of the mid 1980s, 
they became net drawers on government budgets, rather than net providers. It appeared that 
the SOEs were undertaking many activities which the private sector could probably do better, 
since property rights would ensure greater productivity and bankruptcy laws would weed out 
the unproductive enterprises. The theory of market failure was overtaken by the theory of non 
market or bureaucratic failure (Stiglitz, 1989). The international community agreed and 
urged, particularly after the success of early privatization in the United Kingdom that 
governments shed their public enterprise burden, deregulate sectors formerly monopolized by 
the public sectors, and provide an enabling environment for the private sector to develop. 
Privatization thereafter has been widely promoted in the sphere of industries, services and 
agencies (Kay and Thompson, 1986; Kikery, Nellis and Shirley, 1992; Nellis and Kikery, 
1989; Ramamurti, 1992, 1999; Yarrow, 1999; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).  
In developing nations, the market oriented policies such as deregulation, privatization, 
and liberalization, were adopted or imposed largely under programs known as stabilization 
and structural adjustments. Privatization proceeds surged significantly in most developing 
countries during the 1990s, reaping record revenues of USD 66.6 billion in 1997, mainly as 
result of divestitures in the infrastructure sectors. During the period 1990 to 1998, more than 
USD 270 billion was collected through privatization proceeds in developing countries. Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific 
contributed to the largest share of privatization proceeds, accounting for 57 percent, 26 
percent and 14 percent of total privatization revenues respectively (Table 1). In South Asia a 
total of USD 10 billion was collected (over the period 1990-98) as privatization proceeds, out 
of which more than 70 percent came from privatization in India (World Bank, 2000). 
 
Privatization and Public Enterprise Reform in India 
After India’s independence in 1947, a socialistic pattern of society was included in the Constitution and 
Directive Principles of the State policy. The industrial policy resolution of 1948 and 1956 stressed the 
need for a mixed economy, under which the public sector was to play a significant role. This concept 
enjoyed almost universal acceptance during the 1950s and 60s. As a result, the public sector became a 
‘force’ to be reckoned with. Starting from only five SOEs accounting for an investment of Rs. 290 
million in 1950, the number of operating Central State Owned Enterprises had reached a total of 240 
with investments of Rs. 2,525,540 million as on 31St March, 2000. However, over time the Central 
governments experienced grave financial constraints. Most of the SOEs were incurring losses. The 
financial compulsion became the main reason for the Centre to embark upon the policy of 
disinvestment.    
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In order to reform its State Owned Enterprises, the Government of India considered a wide 
range of measures. Depending on the suitability and convenience, India chose a few or all of them. The 
spectrum of options available to reform SOEs is shown in Figure –1 (Kaur 2003).  The extreme left 
corner shows the reforms that could be introduced within the existing ownership pattern.  A gradual 
move to the right increases the role of the private sector. The extreme right corner depicts total 
divestiture, whereby the public sector enterprise is sold off either to the private sector, employees or the 
general public. Thus the SOEs could be made more efficient by adopting various modalities of 
reform options. While on the one hand the policy makers could consider the induction of 
private ownership in publicly owned enterprises, on the other hand they could also consider 
introducing competition in product and factor markets as a more important determinant of 
allocative efficiency, than whether a firm is publicly owned or privately owned.  This is 
because several studies have shown that ownership per se - public or private - is not the 
factor, which determines efficiency.  In fact, it is the degree of competition.  Thus, provided 
there is sufficient competition, there is no discrepancy in efficiency between privately and 
publicly owned enterprises (Williamson, 1969, 1970; Baumol, 1967; Alchian and Kessel 1962, 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Furubotn and Pejuvich 1972).  Therefore, in such enterprises (where 
lack of competition is the major problem), if efficiency is to be improved, a mere change of 
ownership may not lead to desirable results.  In fact, just by enhancing competition (e.g. by 
allowing private sector to operate in areas reserved for the public sector i.e. Greenfield 
Privatization), it may be possible to increase the efficiency of SOEs. Further, the policy 
environment within which public enterprises operate, as well as their management structure, has more to 
do with their performance, relative to private enterprises, than the ownership of their assets.  Therefore, 
by granting greater autonomy to the managers of public enterprises and thereby also making them more 
accountable (i.e. by making the SOEs sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government , 
also known as cold privatization ), one could enhance the productivity of the public enterprises.  This 
implies that, given the interventionist role of the State, the important question is not the extent but the 
quality of such intervention. 
This paper has 5 sections. The first three sections discuss the various modalities of 
reforming SOEs i.e. privatization, greenfield privatization and cold privatization adopted by 
India since the 1990s. The various modalities adopted by Indian policy makers while 
addressing the privatization and public enterprise reform process in India, shows that 
adequate concerns about ownership, competition and regulation, which have a direct bearing 
on the issue of the relative performance of publicly owned and privately owned firms have 
been made. In section 4, a suggestive action plan stating how to spur reforms and improve the 
outcomes is discussed, while the last section concludes the paper with some policy 
implications.    
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 Section 1 
Privatization through Change of Ownership 
 The Industrial Policy Statement of 24th July, 1991, envisaged disinvestments of part of 
Government holdings in the equity share capital, in the case of selected public enterprises , 
with the following objectives in mind: 
• To raise resources 
• To encourage wider public participation, and 
• To promote greater accountability. 
From 1991 to 2000, the emphasis of Indian privatization was on disinvestment - the 
offloading of government’s minority shares to the public or financial institutions. During this 
period, the government offloaded shares in as many as 39 public enterprises. However, since 
March 2000 emphasis has increasingly been on strategic sales of identified SOEs .Strategic 
sale refers to outright transfer of control in SOEs to private management. This normally 
involves the sale of 26 percent or more of government equity to a private party. Table 1 
briefly summarizes the amount realized and the number of SOEs disinvested or privatized till 
date. 
 
Table 1 
Disinvestments from 1991 to 2003 
Realization and Methodologies Adopted 
 
  Sale of Minority 
Shares 1991-92 to 
1999-2000 
Strategic sales 
1999-2000 
till date 
 
Total 
1. Number of SOEs 39* 35* 68 
2. Equity sold(Rs million) 27930 8940 36870 
3. 
As % of total equity of 
Central  Government 
(as on Mar 2000) 
 
3% 
 
1.13% 
 
4.13% 
4. 
Total Receipts 
(Rs million) 
 
152860 
 
108290 
 
261150 
5. 
Realization as multiple 
of equity sold 
 
7 
 
12 
 
*Seven SOEs are common to both modes. 
 
Modern Foods was the first SOE to be strategically sold. Ever since the sale of 
Modern Foods, every single disinvestment has followed the strategic sale route. The second 
strategic sale was of Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO). Fifty one percent of its shares 
were sold to Sterlite Industries for Rs 5,515 million. Following this sale, the government was 
quick to proceed with strategic sales in important firms by divesting 51 percent of the shares 
in Computer Maintenance Corporation to Tata Sons and 74 percent of the shares in HTL, 
PPL and Jessop (for Rs 550 mn, Rs.1520 mn, Rs. 180 mn) to Himachal Futuristic 
Corporations, M/s Zuari Industries & M/s Ruia Cotex Ltd respectively. 
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So far 35 central SOEs have been strategically sold. Of these, nineteen are hotels of Indian 
Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) and three are hotels of Hotel Corporation of India 
Ltd. (HCIL) Together, these hotels have contributed Rs. 6,866 million towards divestiture 
proceeds. For all the nineteen hotels, 100 percent of the equity was sold. In terms of 
individual sales, as shown in Fig 2, maximum proceeds (Rs.37 bn) were collected by selling 
25 percent of the equity in VSNL , followed by the contribution made by selling 27.5 percent 
equity of Maruti Udyog-MUL (Rs19 bn), and by Indian Petrochemicals-IPCL( Rs 15 bn).  
 
Analysis of Privatization Policies  
1.1 Mode of Sale 
The government of India, initially started the process of privatization by partially disinvesting 
the shares of its select enterprises. This continued from 1991 till 2000. However, since the 
sale of Modern Foods in 2000, every sale has been a strategic sale (Kaur 2003 b).  
Is the methodology of strategic sale right? It is generally perceived in the Ministry of 
Disinvestment that strategic sales along with transfer of management control, as opposed to 
market sale of shares in small lots, best serves the principal objectives of privatization, 
namely, improvement in firm’s efficiency and revenue maximization for the government. In 
the Indian context this has worked as can be seen from the Price Earnings Ratio of the shares 
sold by partial divestiture and strategic sale. The realization as a Multiple of Equity Sold 
increased from 7 during the partial disinvestment stage to 12 during the time of strategic sales 
(Table 1). However, when sales are being made to private parties (and not to general public), 
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 there is a lack of ‘democratic privatization’. That is, it does not result in widespread 
ownership of shares. This is in sharp contrast to the privatization in United Kingdom where 
as a result of ‘democratic privatization’, people of all kinds bought shares, resulting in a 
widening of the capital market. It is in this sphere that the Indian policy makers have a lot to 
learn from say their British counterparts in widening the base of the capital market. For 
instance, when British Telecom (BT) had to be privatized, more than £ 4 billion worth of 
shares were planned to be sold.  This was seven times larger than the world’s then largest 
equity sale of AT&T in USA equaling $ 1 billion.  Obviously, the target was hard to meet.  
Nevertheless, not only were the shares of BT sold – they were actually nine times over-
subscribed. Since the watershed sale of BT, every UK privatization offering has been over-
subscribed.  
The important lesson to be learnt is how did the British policy makers managed to do 
what they did, despite widespread criticism to sell off shares to the ordinary people.  The 
answer lies in several innovations introduced to market the shares of BT to new buyers 
(Moore 1992). As a result of ‘democratic privatization’, people of all kinds bought shares in 
the companies privatized in UK, resulting in a widening of the capital market.  
.    
1.2 Amount Realized versus Amount Targeted 
In the Indian context, it is a matter of concern that the amount realized through disinvestment 
has fallen far short of the amount targeted. Table 2 shows that the total amount realized 
through disinvested from 1991 to 2003 was Rs. 261 billion (USD 5.7 billion) against a target 
of Rs. 923 billion (USD 22 billion) leading to an average under subscription of more than 70 
percent. This needs to be contrasted with the revenue proceeds of USD 7.0 billion realized 
from the sale of a single British company viz. British Telecom. The disinvestment proceeds 
(Target versus realized) is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Table 2 Disinvestments during 1991 – 2003 
Round SOEs offered Target 
Rs. Million 
Realized 
Rs Million 
Realization as 
% of Target 
1991-92 46 25000 30380 121.1 
1992-93 29 35000 1913O 54.6 
1993-94 0 35000 0 0 
1994-95 17 40000 48500 121.2 
1995-96 4 70000 1680 2.4 
1996-97 1 50000 3810 7.6 
1997-98 1 48000 9060 18.9 
1998-99 3 50000 11870* 23.7 
1999-00 4 10,0000 18290 18.3 
2000-01 4 10,0000 18700 18.7 
2001-02 9 12,0000 56320 46.9 
2002-03 5 12,0000 33480 27.9 
2003-04 3 13,0000 9930 7.6 
1991-2004 49 923,000 261,150 28.3 
*Further a sum of Rs.41840 million was realized by disinvesting equity holding amongst three PSEs inter-se namely ONGC, 
IOC and GAIL 
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 There is, thus, a large gap between the revenues planned to be raised and the amount 
actually raised. In fact except for the first year of divestment in 1991-92, in no other year 
could the government realize revenues greater than the targeted level of disinvestment. The 
proceeds in 1994-95 are larger than the targeted proceeds, since Rs. 22,900 million was 
actually from disinvestments done during March 1993-94 - the proceeds of which could only 
be realized in 1994-95. On an average only 25 percent of the amount targeted could be 
realized in the 13 year period from 1992 to 2004.  
 
 
Figure 3 
Disinvestment Proceeds(Target versus Realized 1992-2004)
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The market for SOE shares seems to have followed the Akerlof’s Model.  Akerlof 
(1979) had stated that a market where asymmetry of information exists between the buyers 
and the sellers, where quality is a major factor in enabling a trade that: 
1) Either only the very worst cars (read SOE scrips) will be on the roads (read sold); 
or 
2) No trade will take place at all.   
 
Thus, the analogy of market for bad cars, known as ‘lemons’, could be applied to the 
SOE equity. 
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 1.3 Disinvestment and the Efficiency Dimension  
The two relevant questions in our context are:  
• Whether the sale of a part of the equity would force the government of India and the 
new shareholders to monitor the SOE’s managers more effectively?  
• How far are the SOEs’ shares traded on the stock market so that prices of these shares 
can be looked upon as an indicator of management’s performance?   
 
Answering the first part of the question (i.e., whether the partial sale of equity 
improves shareholders monitoring), the following observation needs to be made. For many of 
the SOEs, less than 2 percent of the equity has been disinvested, since the inception of the 
disinvestment policy in 1991-92. In fact for 17 out of the 39 enterprises less than 10 percent 
of the shares have been disinvested. Only in six SOEs (namely HOC, HPCL, IPCL, MTNL, 
MFIL and VSNL) did the extent of divestiture exceed 40 percent of government equity.   If it 
is assumed that at least 51 percent of the shares have to be divested to the private sector for 
effective efficiency implications, then it is clear that this would not happen. However, with 
the governments’ recent decisions to strategically sell SOEs one could expect efficiency 
enhancement in the concerned SOEs.  
 
We now try to answer the next question (i.e. how far the SOEs shares are actively 
traded on the stock market, so that the prices of these shares can be looked upon as an 
indicator of the managements performance). As of January 20, 2000, shares of SOEs 
comprised a weight of 14 percent in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Index. Stocks like 
IPCL, HPCL, ONGC, VSNL and BPCL, which came out with public issue and invoked 
tremendous responses from the retail investor are very liquid because of wider holding. On 
the other hand shares like CONCOR and HOCL are thinly traded. Moreover, the main 
activity is between the financial institutions. Participation by the retail investor is almost 
negligible. Further, it is estimated that nearly 80 percent of SOE shares acquired by financial 
institutions and mutual funds during Jan. 1992 to March 1993 and later, still await being 
offloaded in the secondary market. Since SOE shares are not traded actively, their prices do 
not reflect management’s performance. It is undoubtedly clear that the efficiency of 
privatization exercise will critically depend on the ability of private participants to take full 
part in the exercise. It is in this sphere that the Indian policy makers have a lot to learn from 
say their British counterparts in widening the base of the capital market.  
 
1.4 Disinvestment and the Fiscal Dimension 
At the time of launching of the disinvestment policy in July 1991, a three fold objective - 
namely, to raise resources; to encourage wider public participation; and to promote greater 
accountability was envisaged. However, it is often stated that the prime objective of 
disinvestment is mainly to mobilize non-inflationary resources for the budget.  This being the 
case, it is necessary to have a close look at the disinvestment proceeds and its relation to 
fiscal deficit. This is shown in Table 3 and Figure 4. Table 3 reveals that the amount of 
earnings realized through SOE disinvestment is Rs. 261 billion, while the total fiscal deficit 
since 1991-92 has been to the tune of Rs. 11873 billion This means that on an average only 
2.2 percent of the fiscal deficit has been financed through the sale of SOE equity (shown by 
the dotted line in Fig 4), being as low as 0.28 percent in 1995-96 and 0 percent in 1993-94 
(Figure 4). Therefore, one can conclude that the current levels of disinvestment are of limited 
consequence for closing the fiscal deficit. However, this is not to say that disinvestment 
proceeds per se have been insignificant. 
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Table 3 
Deficit and Disinvestment (In Rs. Million) 
YEAR CENTER’S GROSS 
FISCAL DEFICIT 
DISINVESTMENT 
PROCEEDS 
DISINVESTMENT AS % 
OF FISCAL DEFICIT 
1991-92 363250 30380 8.36 
1992-93 401730 19130 4.76 
1993-94 602570 NIL 0 
1994-95 577030 48500 8.4 
1995-96 602430 1680 0.28 
1996-97 667330 3810 0.57 
1997-98 889370 9060 1.02 
1998-99 1133480 11870 1.05 
1999-00 1047170 18290 1.75 
2000-01 1188160 18700 1.57 
2001-02 1409550 56320 3.99 
2002-03 1454660 33480 2.3 
2003-04 1536370 9930 0.65 
1991-92 to 
2003-04 
11873100 261150 2.20 
 
 
Figure 4 
Disinvestment as Percentage of Fiscal Deficit
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1.5 The Employment Implication of Divestiture  
The impact of liberalization on employment primarily depends on the components of 
measures one takes into account, viz. stabilization or structural adjustment.  It is generally 
hypothesized that stabilization measures are likely to have an adverse effect on employment 
growth where as the impact of structural adjustment on employment depends on several 
factors.  While some factors may work towards creating a positive impact on employment (by 
improving efficiency and productivity- Joshi and Little,1996) others may work towards 
worsening of the employment situation (by making the pattern of growth more capital 
intensive or as an outcome of a more liberal exit policy and privatization – Ghosh, 1995; 
Datt, 1997;  Kundu, 1993). 
Largely, through the practical documentation provided by the trade unions, it is 
widely accepted that privatization usually results in a decline in the number of employees, as 
well as changes in organization, pay and other working conditions. Therefore, with 
divestiture, as far as the workers are concerned, initial apprehensions regarding employment 
are justified.  The change of ownership from public to private usually means losing a status 
resembling that of a civil servant to becoming a private sector employee with no guaranteed 
job security.  Moreover, positive human resource policies and a closer eye on society 
concerns are generally associated with public ownership, largely because of the narrower 
economic objectives characteristic of privatized or private enterprises.  Therefore, the trade 
unions general stance towards divestiture is largely defensive and uncompromising. 
Nevertheless, it is also interesting to note that there have also been instances whereby 
employment has been protected through guarantees given by governments, or by agreements 
signed between trade unions and governments and/or the new employing body (ILO – SAAT, 
1997; and Oestmann, 1994).  
 
In India the policy of disinvestment has been looked upon with skepticism. The 
strategic sale of BALCO in 2000, to a private party was met with a lot of resistance from the 
workers. They went on an indefinite strike, which lasted for over 60 days. They allowed 
Sterlite Industries (the new employers) entry into the premises only when the latter agreed 
not to retrench a single worker. Given this, the focus of this sub-section is specifically to 
examine the impact of disinvestment on employment levels in the Indian SOEs.   
The public sector in India until the late 1980s played a fundamental role in the 
development of the economy. It accounted for almost 70 percent of the total employment in 
the ‘organized sector’. Despite the process of liberalization in early 1990’s, the public sector 
continued to account for a large percent of total employment in the organized sector. 
However, its share marginally declined from 71.2 percent in 1990 to 69 percent in 1999 
(Public Enterprise Survey, Various Issues; Kaur, 002). 
 
We now show the break up of the level of employment in the 240 SOEs in terms 
of employment in the disinvested and non disinvested SOEs for the period 1981 to 2000 
(Table 4).The rates of growth of employment in the SOEs, divested SOEs and non 
divested SOEs were 15.15 percent, 19.16 and 11.3 percent respectively for the period 
1981 to 1991. The corresponding figures for the post reform period (1991 to 2000) were 
minus 17.5 percent, minus 17.8 percent and minus 17.4 percent respectively. This 
implies that the decline in employment in the post reform era was almost the same for 
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 the three categories. Moreover, the share of employment in disinvested SOEs to total 
SOE employment remained at 27 percent in the 10-year period. This indicates that even 
though the absolute number of people employed in disinvested SOEs decreased from 0.6 
million in 1990-91 to 0.51 million in 1999-00, it may have nothing to do with the policy 
of disinvestment per se. 
 
Table -4 
Employment in Disinvested and Non Disinvested SOEs 
(in millions) 1981-2000 
 
Year Employment in 
SOEs 
Employment in 
Disinvested SOEs 
Employment In 
 Non Disinvested SOEs 
Employment in 
Disinvested SOEs as 
percent of total SOE 
employment 
 1981-82 1.94  0.50 1.44 25.80 
 82-83 2.02  0.53 1.50 25.98 
 83-84 2.07  0.54  1.53 26.11 
 84-85 2.11 0.56 1.55 26.38 
 85-86  2.15 0.57 1.59 26.36 
 86-87 2.21 0.59 1.62 26.50 
 87-88 2.21 0.59 1.63 26.55 
 88-89 2.21 0.59 1.61 26.88 
 89-90 2.24 0.59 1.64 26.81 
 90-91  2.22  0.60 1.62 27.00 
 91-92 2.18   0.60 1.58 27.35 
 92-93 2.15  0.59 1.56 27.60 
 93-94 2.07  0.58 1.50 28.04 
94-95 2.06  0.57 1.50 27.60 
 95-96 2.05  0.56 1.50 27.29 
 96-97 2.01  0.55 1.50 27.30 
 97-98  1.96  0.54 1.42 27.50 
 98-99 1.90  0.53 1.47 27.80 
 99-00 1.85 0.51 1.35 27.39 
 Source- Public Enterprise Survey-Various issues 
 
In figure 5 we can clearly see that the employment in the post reform era has declined in 
both the divested and non divested SOEs. Interestingly, the decline in employment in the 
post reform period has been greater for the non-disinvested SOEs than for the disinvested 
SOEs. 
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 Figure 5 
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Section 2 
Greenfield Privatization 
Privatization as a process that aims at reducing the involvement of the State or the public 
sector in the nation’s economic activities, by shifting the divide between public sector and 
private sector in favour of the latter (Greenfield Privatization) has made considerable 
progress since the introduction of the new economic policy (NEP) in 1991.  The process of 
re-divide has been mainly through:  
• Delicensing of major industries  
• Decline in number of areas reserved for public sectors, and 
• Encouraging direct foreign investments 
Thus, the role of the public sector which was sought to be enlarged in the Industrial Policy 
Resolution (IPR) of 1956 is henceforth to be limited to essential infrastructure and defense 
and more and more areas are now being opened to the private sector.  Encouraging private 
sector participation has been the main thrust of reforms in SOEs most of which are in the 
infrastructure sector.  A wide spectrum of services such as transportation (railways, roads, 
civil aviation, ports and shipping), power generation, transmission and distribution and 
telecommunication services have now been opened to the private sector. In these areas, new 
schemes of Build Operate Lease Transfer (BOLT), Build Operate Transfer (BOT) and Build 
Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) have been introduced (Kaur 1999). Under the BOLT scheme 
the private entrepreneurs are invited to build the asset and then lease the constructed assets to 
the public sector. The public sector pays the private entrepreneur the lease charges for the 
asset. On the expiry of the lease period, the asset is transferred to the public sector for the 
remaining period of the economic life of the asset.  Under the BOT scheme, the private 
operator builds the project at hand, operates it till it has broken even and then transfers it to 
the government, who takes care of the asset from then on. Similarly, BOOT is functionally 
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 the same as above, except for the fact that the ownership of the project/asset resides with the 
private operator. The main differences between these modes of private sponsor participation 
are indicated in Table 5.  
 
Table 5 
Differences between Modes of Private Sector Participation 
 
Arrangement Ownership of 
Assets 
Operator of the Facility during 
the concession Period 
Transfer of Assets after 
Concession Period 
BOO Private Private No 
BOT Government Private To Government 
BOLT Private Private/Government Yes 
  
In the transport sector, schemes such as own your wagon, own your tourist train, 
maintenance of a railway station, privatization of catering have also been initiated.  Roads are 
also now open to the private sector.  In fact, the Thane-Bhiwadi bypass in Maharashtra and 
the Udaipur bypass in Rajasthan have gone to private investors on BOT basis.  In the case of 
ports, leasing out of existing assets of the port to the private sector has been introduced.  In 
air transport the Indian skies have opened up to the private sector to include two scheduled 
private airlines which provide regular domestic air services along with Indian Airlines. In 
addition there are 41 non scheduled operators providing air taxi/non scheduled air transport 
services. In the telecommunication sector, in both the basic and the value added services, 
private entry is now permitted.  Various value added services such as cellular mobiles, radio 
paging, electronic mail and video conferencing are now provided by the private sector.  In the 
power sector private participation is now allowed in both generation and transmission.  
 
 
Section 3 
Cold Privatization: Memorandum of Understanding 
The concept of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), also referred to as Cold Privatization 
is a very simple one.  It is supposed to be a “freely” negotiated performance agreement 
between a public enterprise and the Government acting as an owner of the public enterprise, 
in which both parties clearly specify their commitments and responsibilities.  The need for 
this device arose because no one, including the public enterprises knew what was expected of 
them.  Different agencies of the Government - Planning Commission, Finance Ministry, 
Auditor General, Administrative Ministry and Parliament - had different and often conflicting 
expectations from these enterprises.  Most frequently it is described as a problem resulting 
from the fact that public enterprises very often have “multiple principals” with “multiple 
goals” that are often conflicting.  MOU was recommended by the Arjun Sengupta Committee 
as an instrument to reconcile these multiple objectives in a single document and send a 
consistent signal to public enterprises.  Further, once the tasks of public enterprises have been 
specified in the MOU, these enterprises are to be evaluated only against them and given total 
operational freedom to achieve their goals.  The idea is to simultaneously increase 
accountability and autonomy by moving towards management by objectives instead of 
exercising control through procedures. 
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  The MOUs have progressively covered an increasing number of SOEs. From just 4 
SOEs that signed an MOU in 1987-88, the number of SOEs that signed MOU in 2002 is 109.  
At the beginning of the period when the MOU is signed, not only is a weight assigned to each 
criterion but also a set of five criterion values, varying from 1 to 5, indicating excellent, very 
good, good, fair and poor performance is listed. At the end of the period, the actual 
performance is compared to the criterion value.  Then, through the process of interpolation, a 
raw score is evaluated for each criterion.  This raw score when multiplied by its weight gives 
the weighted raw score (WRS). Summation of all WRS gives a “composite score” (Kaur 
1998). The Bureau of Public Enterprise has given the MOU ratings as follows: 
 
 
Composite Score Between Rating 
 1.00 -   1.50 
 1.51 -   2.50 
 2.51 -   3.50 
 3.51 -   4.50 
 4.51 -   5.00 
Excellent 
Very Good 
Good 
Average 
Poor 
 
 
 Based on the above scores, the percentage of SOEs getting a rating of either excellent 
or very good has always been higher than 70, being as high as 96 percent in 1990-91. 
However, the performance of SOE based on MOU rating should be analyzed with caution, 
since despite a good ranking the SOE may not be performing well.  This is because the 
possibility of fudging targets cannot be ruled out. 
 
 Since the composite score of each SOE depends upon its actual performance vis-à-vis 
the target assigned to each criterion, it would be in the interest of the managers to set soft 
targets that can be achieved easily.  Setting soft targets, no doubt will make a mockery of the 
evaluation system.  In order to check this, the Adhoc Task Force (which consists of eminent 
management experts, chartered accountants and professors) assists the High Power 
Committee (consisting of those Secretaries to the Government of India who do not sign a 
MOU themselves) to monitor the targets set by the managers and their performance.  The 
Planning Commission and Finance Ministry also examines these targets before they come to 
the ATF.  However, despite all this, target setting has often been soft in the past.  Target 
setting could be soft if any of the following happens: 
• When actual value far exceeds not only the targeted value but also the criterion value 
of excellent, and/or 
• When target values for next year are set lower than actual achievements of the 
previous year. 
 
For instance, for the enterprise Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), almost every 
year the actual performance related to the financial indicator Profit before Depreciation, 
Interest and Tax (PBDIT), exceeded not only its targeted value but also the criterion value of 
excellent.  For instance, as given in Table 6, in 1991-92 the enterprise’s target was to make a 
‘PBDIT’ to the tune of Rs. 2700 million.  Yet, it exceeded its target by Rs. 1330 million to 
ultimately attain Rs. 4030 million. This was Rs. 1280 million more than the criterion value of 
excellent.  Similarly, for the year 1994-95, its target was to attain a ‘Gross Margin’ of Rs. 
4360 million.  The criterion value to attain an excellent score was to get Rs. 58 million more 
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 than the ‘very good criterion’ value of Rs. 4360 million, i.e. in order to get an excellent rating 
it needed to have a gross margin of Rs. 4418 million.  Yet, in the year 1994-95, its actual 
performance on this criterion was Rs. 6090 million i.e. almost Rs. 1670 million higher than 
its excellent score.  Same holds for the year 1995-96, in which its actual Gross Margin 
exceeded the criterion value of excellent by Rs. 380 million. 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Instances when Actual Value Exceeded the Criterion Value of Excellent 
 
 
ENTERPRISE 
 
Year EXCELLENT 
 
TARGET 
 
 
 
ACTUAL 
BPCL 
 I) PBDIT (Rs. Million) 
 
 
 
 
 II) GROSS MARGIN 
 (Rs. Million) 
 
 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
 
2900 
2750 
3290 
 
3654.5 
4418 
5774 
 
2820 
2700 
3270 
 
3600.9 
4359 
5695.6 
 
3490 
4030 
4735 
 
4069.1 
6090 
6154.5 
 
 
Similarly, instances can also be cited for various indicators, such as ‘PBDIT’, ‘Net 
Profit as a Percent of Capital Employed’, ‘Refinery Crude Throughput’, ‘Market Share’ and 
‘Fuel and Loss’, where very often the targets fixed for next year were set lower than the 
actual achievements of previous year.  For instance, for the indicator ‘PBDIT’, the target for 
1991-92 was fixed at Rs. 2700 million even though it had made Rs. 3490 million in the 
previous year.  Similarly, the same target was fixed at Rs. 3270 million for 1992-93, which 
was lower than Rs. 4030 million made in the previous year.  In fact, the target of Rs. 3270 
million for 1992-93 was not only lower than the actual achievement of 1991-92 (Rs. 4020 
million), but even lower than the achievement of Rs. 3490 million in 1990-91 (Details given 
in Table 7).  A justification for lower targets could be an adverse market condition or rise in 
input prices. However, no such condition prevailed since the enterprise actually made a profit 
of Rs. 4735 million i.e. Rs. 1465 million more than its targeted value of Rs. 3270 million. 
To cite another example, consider the indicator ‘Fuel and Loss’. With respect to this 
indicator, it is interesting to note that every year since 1990-91 the target fixed for next year 
is lower than the actual achievement of the previous year. As a result, each year’s 
performance exceeded the target (as well as the criterion value under excellent) set for the 
same year.  Because of this the enterprise continued to get a raw score of ‘one’ even though 
its performance was deteriorating over the period. For instance, its efficiency in ‘Fuel and 
Loss’ decreased from 5.83 percent in 1990-91 to 6.22 percent in 1994-95. Yet, this decline 
could not be captured by the performance of the enterprise based on MOU rating.  
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 Table 7 
Cases when Targets for Next Year Were set Lower than Actual Achievement of Previous Year 
 
Enterprise 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 
BPCL 
I) PBDIT (Rs. Million) 
 Target  
       Actual   
 Excellent 
 
II) Net Profit After Tax as % of Capital Employed 
 Target  
       Actual   
 Excellent 
 
III) Refinery Crude Throughput (Mn Tonnes) 
 Target  
       Actual   
 Excellent 
 
IV) Market Share (%) 
 Target  
       Actual   
 Excellent 
 
V) Fuel and Loss (%) 
 Target  
       Actual   
 Excellent 
 
3270 
4730 
3290 
 
 
Criterion 
did not 
exist 
 
 
7.20 
7.23 
7.25 
 
 
18.61 
19.22 
18.64 
 
 
6.80 
6.18 
6.70 
 
Criterion 
did not 
exist 
 
 
11.15 
12.85 
11.44 
 
 
7.05 
7.21 
7.25 
 
 
18.61 
19.88 
18.64 
 
 
6.85 
6.19 
6.70 
 
Criterion 
did not 
exist 
 
 
11.81 
15.21 
12.13 
 
 
7.00 
7.41 
7.20 
 
 
18.61 
20.10 
18.64 
 
 
6.60 
6.22 
6.45 
 
Criterion 
did not 
exist 
 
 
12.68 
13.44 
12.95 
 
 
7.05 
7.35 
7.20 
 
 
18.69 
20.35 
19.75 
 
 
6.70 
6.40 
6.50 
 
 
Section 4 
Implementation of Reform 
There are no blueprints that guarantee the success of reforms.  However, there are some 
ground rules, derived from research and practical experience that could increase the 
probability of success. Such reform options are shown in Figure 6. For instance, the figure 
shows that reforms should be initiated only when the country is ready to accept and absorb 
them.  Countries that are not ready for SOE reforms should first introduce measures (such as 
reduce fiscal deficits and introduce trade, industrial and financial sector reforms) to create 
conditions for such reforms to be successful.   
 
 For countries that are ready for SOE reforms, the foremost task is to decide whether 
SOEs need to be divested or is a suitable mechanism to be introduced to enhance efficiency 
without divesting them.  Enterprises that are to be divested could be operating in either 
competitive or potentially competitive markets (most manufacturing activities) or natural 
monopoly markets (some utilities and most infrastructures). Selling off competitive SOEs is 
not much of a problem.  Nevertheless, efforts should be made to make the sale as transparent 
as possible.  For divesting enterprises operating in monopoly market environment two 
considerations should be kept in mind: 
• Firstly, one must try to unbundle large firms by, say, breaking a national monopoly 
into regional monopolies or by separating one activity from the other.  For instance, 
electricity generation could be separated from electricity production. 
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 Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Yes    No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes  No 
                No 
 
          
  
 
 
 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
 
 
Is Divestiture 
Possible? 
• Use MOUs Selectively but Effectively 
• Unbundle Large Firms 
• Increase Competition 
• Decrease Soft Credit 
• Reduce Subsidies & Transfers 
Are Natural 
Monopolies to be 
divested? 
Is Country 
Ready for 
Reform? 
• Ensure Adequate Regulatory 
Mechanism 
• Unbundle Large Firms 
Enhance Readiness for SOE 
Reform by Implementing 
Other Reforms 
Are SOEs 
Potentially 
Competitive? 
• Divest 
• Ensure Transparency 
• Competitive Bidding 
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 • Secondly, by ensuring that a credible regulatory authority is in place so as to overlook 
the functioning of newly privatized firm. Research has shown that regulatory 
contracts are more successful when either the price cap1 or benchmark regulations2 
are adopted instead of rate of return regulation3. This is because rate of return 
regulation does not induce the firm to lower costs (World Bank, 1995). 
Another important area that needs to be addressed relates to the question ‘whom to 
sell’.  In other words, who are to be the potential buyers of SOEs equity?  Because of the 
desire to spread ownership widely, public offerings of shares are the preferred choice.  
Failing  this,  employee  buyouts are an alternative provided  that  the  funds are available and 
the company's cash flow can  support  the  necessary leverage.  The most difficult sales are to 
corporate purchasers particularly if overseas buyers are involved. The politics of privatization 
are such that  the domestic  investors normally  have  to  be  given preference  although  
minority  sales  overseas can  be  an important factor in bringing an otherwise domestic sale 
to a successful conclusion. 
In practice, therefore, a hierarchy of political desirability can be established, which 
coincides fortuitously  with  the  level  of  capital  market sophistication,  that is necessary to 
bring the sales to  a  conclusion. This hierarchy is demonstrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 
Hierarchy of Political Desirability in Privatization Options 
         
 
 
INCREASING DESIRABILITY 
 
• PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
• EMPLOYEE BUYOUTS 
• PRIVATE TRADE SALES 
• OVERSEAS TRADE 
SALES 
 
 
INCREASING CAPITAL 
MARKET 
SOPHISTICATION 
 
The public offering represents the high point of privatization. For countries with 
undeveloped capital markets, overseas trade sales may be the only option, even if undesirable 
politically. 
Unfortunately, the capital market in India is not well developed. The size of investor 
population is very small and is less than 1 percent. The ownership pattern of securities is 
heavily biased in favor of 5 centers viz.; Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkota, Ahmedabad and Chennai. 
Semi urban towns with population of less than one lakh have insignificant security holdings. 
Farmers as shareholders are negligible. They have less then 3 percent of the paid up value of 
the shareholdings. There is thus a need to tap the large untapped rural and semi urban 
deposits while going ahead with privatization. 
                                                 
1 The price cap regulation is also known as the (RPI - X) regulation.  Under this regulatory mechanism, the 
private monopolist cannot charge a price higher than the increase in Retail Price Index (RPI) of all 
commodities minus a politically chosen number, say X.  The higher the value of X, the greater the benefits 
passed on to consumers. 
2 In benchmark regulation (or yardstick regulation), tariffs are set to allow the firm a fair rate of return with 
reference to some yardstick, rather than its actual costs. 
3 Under the rate of return regulation, prices are set in such a manner that the firm can cover costs and make a fair 
rate of return. 
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  Irrespective of the government’s decision to privatize SOEs, some public enterprises 
in competitive and non — competitive markets will remain in the domain of public sector for 
several reasons. Such as: the government’s inability to divest in a competitive and transparent 
manner, lack of administrative capacity to regulate private monopolies, underdeveloped 
capital markets, or for political reasons. 
 In such a situation policy makers have two options: 
i)  One, to go in for management contracts - those between the government and 
private managers managing SOE. 
ii)  Two, to go in for reforms under the existing ownership and existing management. 
 A World Bank Study (1995) shows that management contracts with private managers 
do a better job of improving company performance than contracts with public managers. 
However, management contracts are suitable only in specific sectors (where technology does 
not change rapidly or where the final product is highly visible, easily compared product - 
such as hotel services). Since management contracts are useful for only a small group of 
industries, there still remain potentially competitive and non-competitive enterprises with the 
government. For such enterprises, the governments have no choice but to attempt 
improvements within the existing ownership and management arrangements. For such 
enterprises, the options are: to increase competition by dereserving goods to be produced by 
the public sector only; by delicensing; and by reducing trade barriers; by creating a level 
playing field for the public enterprises; by cutting subsidies and transfers and by using 
performance contracts with public managers selectively but effectively. Performance 
contracts provide greater autonomy to and induce greater accountability among public 
enterprise managers attained. However, due care should be taken to ensure that soft targeting 
does not exist. One reason managers use their information advantage to act opportunistically 
is that the rewards and penalties in the contract do not motivate them to try to improve 
performance. Therefore, monetary incentives should be introduced. However, they should be 
given when the SOE meets not only its contracted target but also improves upon its efficiency 
(Kaur, 2003). 
  Thus in order to reform the SOEs, various options are available, ranging from 
complete divestiture to reforms that can be introduced within the existing ownership pattern.  
 
 
Section 5 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Fiscal compulsions forced the government of India to sell the equity of their enterprises in the 
1990’s and later. So far 39 SOEs have been partially disinvested while 35 SOEs have been 
strategically sold. A total of approximately Rs.300 billion has been raised through 
disinvestments. However, unlike many other developing economies where an aggressive 
policy of privatization (i.e. a transfer of ownership from the public sector to the private 
sector) has been adopted as part of liberalization, this has not been the case in India. In India, 
the new economic policies of liberalization are more in the nature of Greenfield Privatization. 
Such policies have prompted private industrialists to venture into areas earlier reserved for 
the public sector, such as, power, aviation, telecommunications, roads and railways. These 
policies are expected to have a major thrust on enhancing efficiency in the industry. This is 
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 because removal of entry barriers opens the floodgates of competition. Cold Privatization has 
also been adopted with limited success. 
The process of privatization raises a few set of questions. In the first set are questions 
such as – what are the economic consequences of selling public sector enterprises? Is the 
government doing the right thing by disinvesting? Will privatization deliver? These 
ownership (public versus private) related issues have not gone uncontested. Within an 
orthodox microeconomics framework, it is perfectly possible to argue that in many contexts 
(of which existence of externalities and natural monopoly are the more obvious examples), 
public ownership will do better in terms of economic efficiency than private ownership. 
However, in cases where state failures dominate (of which internalities and unequal 
distribution of power, as against wealth, are the most significant factors), privatization in fact 
may be a better option. That is to say that ownership does matter. The allocation of property 
rights matters because it determines the objectives of the owners of the firm (public or 
private) and the systems of monitoring managerial performance. Since public and private 
ownership differ in both respects, changes in property rights will materially affect the 
incentive structures, the behavior of managements and hence the efficiency of the 
organization. Thus the economic consequences of selling public sector enterprises will get 
reflected in enhanced efficiency of the privatized unit. However, in the Indian scenario, 
changes in performance of SOEs have not materialized due to the nature of disinvestment 
modality adopted till recent years.  
Another set of questions that arise are: whether it was right to sell the companies that 
have been privatized and whether it is desirable to press on with the privatization program? 
Though the questions cannot be answered independently of the mechanisms of competition 
and regulation for the industries concerned, but broadly it can be stated that: privatization is 
appropriate where market failures are less serious than state failures. Therefore, the 
privatization of firms by the central government in reasonably competitive industries, such as 
19 hotels of ITDC, Modern Foods- a bakery, BALCO- an aluminum company, Maruti- a car 
manufacturing company, is fine.  
Regarding the future of privatization process, while the public sector should continue 
to operate in strategic and defense related sectors, for consideration of national security, the 
rest of the enterprises could be privatized. This re-divide in favour of the private sector 
should not be for the reason that efficiency in public sector is at a discount but rather for the 
fact that: 
• Once private sector is allowed in areas hitherto reserved for the public sector, 
competition will enhance, which in turn will increase efficiency of the erstwhile 
monopoly SOEs. 
• Privatization will reduce government’s commitment and involvement in enterprise 
decision making and thereby it will be in a better position to provide infrastructure 
and welfare goods to the public, which at present it is unable to do adequately on 
account of its pre-occupation with production activities.  
Given these considerations, the policy of privatization in the era of globalization, seems to be 
in the right direction. However regarding the strategy adopted, questions such as – why 
strategic sales and why not widening of employee ownership by selling shares to the 
employees or the public will, no doubt, continue to be raised.  
***** 
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